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Abstract—The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocols are the foundation of network
security. The certificate verification in SSL/TLS implementations
is vital and may become the “weak link” in the whole network
ecosystem. In previous works, some research focused on the auto-
mated testing of certificate verification, and the main approaches
rely on generating massive certificates through randomly combin-
ing parts of seed certificates for fuzzing. Although the generated
certificates could meet the semantic constraints, the cost is quite
heavy, and the performance is limited due to the randomness.
To fill this gap, in this paper, we propose DRLgencert, the
first framework on applying deep reinforcement learning to
the automated testing of certificate verification in SSL/TLS
implementations. DRLgencert accepts ordinary certificates as
input and outputs the newly generated certificates which could
trigger discrepancies with high efficiency. Benefited by the deep
reinforcement learning, when generating certificates, our frame-
work could choose the best next action according to the result of
a previous modification, instead of simple random combinations.
At the same time, we developed a set of new techniques to support
the overall design, like new feature extraction method for X.509
certificates, fine-grained differential testing, and so forth. Also,
we implemented a prototype of DRLgencert and carried out a
series of real-world experiments. The results show DRLgencert
is quite efficient, and we obtained 84,661 discrepancy-triggering
certificates from 181,900 certificate seeds, say around 46.5%
effectiveness. Also, we evaluated six popular SSL/TLS imple-
mentations, including GnuTLS, MatrixSSL, MbedTLS, NSS,
OpenSSL, and wolfSSL. DRLgencert successfully discovered 23
serious certificate verification flaws, and most of them were
previously unknown.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Transport Layer Security (SSL) [?] and its predeces-
sor Transport Layer Security (TLS) [18] protocols are the
foundation of network security. They are designed to provide
security and data integrity assurance for Internet commu-
nications. During the SSL/TLS communication, the X.509
certificate is used to authenticate the identity of communi-
cating party. The semantics and syntax of X.509 certificates
have many limitations, described semi-formally in dozens of
IETF’s RFCs (including RFC 2246[13], 2527[11], 2818[26],
4346[14], 5246[15], 5280[12], 6101[18], and 6125[27]). Ver-
ifying the validity of a certificate is a complex process that
includes verifying each certificate in the certificate chain,
checking period of validity, public key, extension, and so forth.
There are many open source SSL/TLS implementations
available online, and developers can use these implementations
for certificate validation without implementing the code by
themselves. However, since the certificate validation is com-
plicated, described in many tedious documents, the authors of
SSL/TLS implementations may have their own understandings
of how to code the logic. In other words, there is no guarantee
that these SSL/TLS implementations can verify each certificate
correctly, which may become the “weak link” in the whole
network ecosystem.
Some researchers[9], [10] have noticed this issue and tried
to achieve the automated testing of certificate verification in
SSL/TLS implementations. One of the mainstream approaches
is the differential testing. If multiple certificate verification
codes give different verification results for the same certificate,
it means some of the certificate verification codes may be
flawed. In the differential testing, the effectiveness of test
results is decided by the quality of input test cases (i.e.,
modified certificates) directly. Better test cases could discover
more design flaws with less time consumption.
In previous attempts, it is common to generate massive
certificates (as test cases) through randomly combining parts
of seed certificates, like Frankencert [9] and Mucert [10].
Although the generated certificates could meet the semantic
constraints, the cost is quite heavy, and the performance is
limited due to the randomness. It may generate a large number
of unhelpful certificates which cannot trigger any flaw. On the
other side, the deep learning technology shows the powerful
capability of information mining and has been widely applied
in biology, medicine, graphics, and cybersecurity, and so forth.
We find the deep learning is suitable for the task of automated
testing of certificate verification.
Our Approach. In this paper, we propose DRLgencert (using
Deep Reinforcement Learning to generate certificates), the
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first framework on applying deep reinforcement learning to
the automated testing of certificate verification in SSL/TLS
implementations. DRLgencert accepts ordinary certificates as
input and outputs the newly generated certificates which could
trigger discrepancies with high efficiency. Benefited by the
deep reinforcement learning, when generating certificates, our
framework could choose the best next action according to the
result of a previous modification, instead of simple random
combinations. At the same time, we developed a set of new
techniques to support the overall design, like new feature ex-
traction method for X.509 certificates, fine-grained differential
testing module, and so forth.
In our research, we implemented DRLgencert and carried
out a series of real-world experiments based on six popu-
lar SSL/TLS implementations, including GnuTLS [1], Ma-
trixSSL [3], mbedTLS [4], NSS [5], OpenSSL [6], and wolf-
SSL [7]. The overall performance analysis shows DRLgencert
is quite efficient, and we could obtain 84,661 discrepancy-
triggering certificates from 181,900 certificate seeds after the
first training episode of DRL network. It means more than
46.5% generated certificates are effective, which is better than
all existing works. Also, DRLgencert successfully discovered
23 serious certificate verification flaws on six implementations,
and most of them were previously unknown. For example,
we found GnuTLS, NSS, and OpenSSL accept version 1, 2,
or 4 certificates, even these v1, v2, v4 certificates have v3
extensions that should only exist in version 3 certificate, which
violates the RFC documents [12]. The reason is that the ver-
sion testing and extension testing functions are implemented
as two independent components in code. We have reported all
these flaws to the corresponding vendors, and the assessments
are in process.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are:
• New framework. We proposed DRLgencert, the first
framework on applying deep reinforcement learning to
the automated testing of certificate verification in SS-
L/TLS implementations. DRLgencert accepts normal cer-
tificates as input and outputs the newly generated certifi-
cates (as the test cases of differential testing) which could
trigger discrepancies with high efficiency.
• New techniques. We developed a set of new techniques
to enable the overall design of DRLgencert, including
new feature extraction method for X.509 certificates,
fine-grained differential testing, and improved certificate
modification actions.
• Implementation and findings. We implemented a pro-
totype of DRLgencert and evaluated it through a se-
ries of real-world experiments. The overall performance
analysis shows DRLgencert is quite efficient, and we
obtained 84,661 discrepancy-triggering certificates from
181,900 certificate seeds. Also, DRLgencert successfully
discovered 23 serious certificate verification flaws on six
popular SSL/TLS implementations, and most of them
were previously unknown.
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Fig. 1. General certificate chain structure.
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Fig. 2. The process of reinforcement learning.
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II gives the background of certificate validation and
deep reinforcement learning. Section III provides the overview
design of DRLgencert. Section IV and Section V illustrate the
differential testing module and deep reinforcement learning
network module respectively. The evaluation results are sum-
marized in Section VI. Section VII reviews the related work,
and finally Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Certificate Validation
Certificate validation usually requires two inputs: trusted CA
certificates and a chain of certificates to be validated. The
general structure of a certificate chain is shown in Figure 1.
Starting from the leaf certificate (end-entity certificate), each
certificate is issued by a superior certificate until a self-signed
CA certificate.
In the verification process, the leaf certificate in the certifi-
cate chain is usually verified first to confirm that the content
of the certificate is valid, including the validity period and
extension content. Then the SSL/TLS client checks whether
the certificate is issued by a higher-level certificate in the
certificate chain, including verifying the issuer, signature, and
extension content. This process continues recursively until the
certificate to be verified appears in the trusted certificate set.
B. Deep Reinforcement Learning
Deep reinforcement learning is a combination of deep
learning and reinforcement learning, which enables robots to
learn independently. The initial achievement is the Deep Q
Learning algorithm proposed by DeepMind in 2013 [24].
In the field of artificial intelligence, an agent is used to
represent a capable object, such as a robot, an unmanned
vehicle, a person, and the like. The problem solved by re-
inforcement learning is to guide the interaction between the
agent and environment. For example, playing a racing game
on a computer, the game is the environment, and then we enter
actions (keyboard operations) to control. What is observed
on the screen is the state of the car and the score. The
score is known as the reward, a factor in the reinforcement
learning. No matter what kind of task, it contains a series
of actions, observations, and feedback value-rewards. The
observed information is the state of the agent. When the agent
executes the action and interacts with the environment, the
environment changes. The reward expresses the degree of good
and bad caused by the change. Figure 2 illustrates the process
of reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning learns from
previous states, actions, rewards to guide the choice of next
action.
Combining deep learning with reinforcement learning can
handle more complex tasks. Deep reinforcement learning,
through continuous training, can get a policy that makes an
agent get as much reward as possible in the task.
III. OVERVIEW OF DRLGENCERT
In this paper, we propose DRLgencert, the first deep
learning-based testing framework for automatic certificate
validation in SSL/TLS implementations. DRLgencert accepts
normal certificates as input and outputs the newly generated
certificates which could trigger discrepancies with high ef-
ficiency. As shown in Figure 3, the DRLgencert framework
consists of three main components: a certificate set, the deep
reinforcement learning network, and the differential testing
module (containing multiple certificate verification programs).
A. Settings
The reinforcement learning is a cyclic process in which an
agent takes actions to change its state and interact with the
environment to obtain a reward. In this process, the agent
judges the merits and demerits of previous actions according to
the reward given by the environment and obtains experience,
so that the agent could choose a better behavior in the future
same or similar state. In DRLgencert, we have the following
settings:
• A certificate instance acts as an agent.
• Multiple SSL/TLS implementations are used as the envi-
ronment.
• The state is defined as a certificate content feature.
• The action is defined as a certificate modification opera-
tion.
• The reward results from the validation results of multiple
SSL/TLS implementations.
B. Framework Overview
DRLgencert starts to run from choosing a certificate in-
stance from the prepared certificate set. Before passing the
certificate to the deep learning network, the differential testing
(see Section IV) is performed on the original certificate(step1
in fig 3). If the test result shows that the certificate has
reached the goal we want, namely, the certificate triggers a
discrepancy(step7,8,2 in fig 3), there is no need to modify
this certificate. Otherwise, we need to extract features from
the certificate based on the pre-defined feature extraction
scheme(step3 in fig 3). The definition of certificate feature
will be discussed in detail in Section V-A later, respectively.
The neural network uses the certificate feature as input(step4 in
fig 3), and the output represents the modification actions. Each
number of the output represents the value of the corresponding
modification action. As mentioned in Section II-B, the deep
reinforcement learning network learns the feedback coming
from the agent interacting with the environment by taking
actions. In DRLgencert, the certificate modification actions
are the actions taken by the deep reinforcement learning on
certificates, and more details will be given in Section V-B.
During the training phase, we select the modification action
to be adopted based on the ε-Greedy strategy. Each time
we choose the most valuable modification action with 90%
probability and randomly select a modification operation with
10% probability(step5 in fig 3). As an advantage, we could
make sure that most modification operations can achieve the
desired effect and also allow some certificate to explore new
combinations of modification actions. In the testing phase
of the neural network, we no longer need to explore new
combinations of actions. Instead, we should guarantee the
maximum validity of the modification actions. Therefore, the
certificate modification action used during the usage phase is
always the most valuable one in all modification actions.
After the certificate is modified, we obtain a new cer-
tificate. This newly generated certificate will be inputted
to the differential testing for multiple certificate verification
programs(step6 in fig 3). After the differential testing, we
obtained the verification result set of each verification pro-
gram. According to the predefined reward definition scheme,
the result is transformed to the corresponding reward(step7,8,9
in fig 3). The definition of reward will be given in Section V-C.
In the DRLgencert framework, we set the range of reward
for -1 and 100. If reward = 100, it means that the certificate
achieves the target we want. It will be collected into our target
certificate database(step2 in fig 3). Its content and verification
result set may help us to analyze and discover possible flaws
of certificate verification implementations. Then choose a new
certificate from database and a new loop begins(step12 in
fig 3). However, if reward = -1, it indicates that, under our
settings, this certificate has no value in analyzing certificate
verification implementations, and further change actions to the
certificate content are required(step10 in fig 3). This process
is described in Algorithm 1:
In our DRLgencert framework, we set max modification
(in Algorithm 1) to 9 and allow up to 10 changes per certifi-
cate, that is a maximum of 10 variants except for the initial
certificate. If this certificate still cannot trigger a discrepancy,
we will discard it and select a new one(step11 in fig 3). In
our experiments, we found 95.5% of the certificates which
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Fig. 3. Overview of DRLgencert framework.
Algorithm 1 Modifying certificates
Input: certDB,max episode,max modification
Output: target certDB
1: episode← 0
2: while episode < max episode do
3: for cert in certDB do
4: modification← 0
5: while modification <= max modification do
6: action← NETWORK(cert)
7: cert← TAKE ACTION(cert, action)
8: reward← DIFFERENTIAL TESTING(cert)
9: if reward == 100 then
10: add cert to target certDB
11: break
12: end if
13: modification← modification+ 1
14: end while
15: end for
16: episode← episode+ 1
17: end while
18: return target certDB
get reward = 100 were modified less than 6 times. Therefore,
if a certificate undoubtedly has the potential to trigger a
discrepancy, 10 times is enough to trigger a discrepancy.
Through the above process, DRLgencert helps us quickly
obtain a large number of certificates suitable for differential
testing, based on the collected certificate data set.
TABLE I
VERIFICATION PROGRAMS AND SUPPORTED MODES
Program Version C-S Mode
File Mode
(with verification utility)
GnuTLS 3.6.0 Y Y (certtool)
MatrixSSL 3.9.3 Y Y (certValidate)
MbedTLS 2.6.0 Y Y (cert app)
NSS 3.28.4 Y Y (certutil)
OpenSSL 1.0.2g Y Y (openssl)
wolfSSL 3.12.2 Y /
Remarks: The mode we used is labeled with bold Y.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL TESTING
Differential testing [23] (also known as differential fuzz
testing) is a popular software testing technique that attempts
to detect errors of a series of similar applications (or different
implementations of the same application) by providing the
same input and observing their execution differences.
Verification Program Setup. In DRLgencert, the initial cer-
tificates and modified certificates are both classified by six
verification programs, including GnuTLS [1], MatrixSSL [3],
mbedTLS [4] (formerly PolarSSL), NSS [5], OpenSSL [6],
and wolfSSL [7] (formerly CyaSSL). We used the latest
versions of these programs (as listed in Table I) and deployed
them on Ubuntu 16.04.
Most of these verification programs provide two verification
methods: C-S mode and file mode. The only exception is
wolfSSL which only supports the C-S mode. In the C-S mode,
the client establishes a connection with the server, receives the
certificate provided by the server, and validates it. Compared
with the C-S mode, the file mode is more convenient. The
program directly loads trust certificates and the certificate to
be verified, then verifies it. In both modes, when they need to
verify a certificate, they call the same functions to verify. The
verification process is the same for both. However, because in
the c-s mode, the program needs to establish a connection
between the client and server first, the operation is more
tedious, and the connection may fail due to network reasons
and the certificate verification section cannot be performed.
In order to speed up the verification process and avoid the
verification failure caused by the connection issue, we selected
the file mode as the certificate verification method with a
priority in DRLgencert. If the file mode is not available, we
used the C-S mode. Table I shows the mode we selected in
each program.
Verification Result Processing. Since each verification pro-
gram has its own understanding of certificate verification, it
leads to different expressions for the same error. Also, the
meanings of the same error code from different programs
are usually diverse. The granularity of verification results of
different programs is not the same, and the verification result
sets are also different.
Inspired by the work of Acer et al. [8], we designed a
normalized solution to process the various verification results.
In details, we grouped the verification results of each program
encountered in our experiment into 16 categories, with a
new error code, making it easy to redefine the reward and
analyze verification codes. Table II shows the classification
of verification results in our system and the number in the
second column (“Error Code”) indicates the new encoding
value of verification results. Due to the diverse granularity,
sometimes multiple verification results from the same verifi-
cation program are classified into same result type. If there
are any validation results that have not been encountered in
previous experiments, they are uniformly grouped into the type
of “other error” and re-classified into an appropriate result
category in next experiment through the updated classification
policies.
Each verification program has its own understanding of the
logic of certificate verification. Therefore, different programs
may give different verification results for the same certificate,
even giving the opposite results. If a certificate is given dif-
ferent verification results (i.e., rejected for different reasons),
it means that the validation logic of the involved verification
programs is different, and the logic of some programs may
be flawed. As shown in the example of Figure 4, OpenSSL
accepts the certificate, while other programs report different
rejection reasons respectively.
To our framework, this certificate sample has the value of
analysis. In DRLgencert, if there exist both acceptance and
rejection in the verification results of a certificate, we define it
as a discrepancy and record this certificate and its verification
results for later analysis.
-2 -2 -4 -7 1 -10
GnuTLS    MatrixSSL  MbedTLS NSS OpenSSL wolfSSL
Cert
Number: error code as in Table II
Fig. 4. Example of result encoding.
V. DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING NETWORK
The core part of DRLgencert is the deep reinforcement
learning network, which is used to generate a large number of
certificates suitable for differential testing.
Compared with other popular deep learning algorithms
(e.g., CNN and LSTM), deep reinforcement learning is un-
supervised, can learn from histories, and provide the optimal
choice. The most famous deployment case is AlphaGo [28],
every time it could select the optimal strategy based on the
current situation. To be specific, we consider: sometimes the
program is very sensitive to the changes in input content,
just like the existence of adversarial examples [20] in image
recognition field. That is, the image recognition program can
correctly recognize a dog’s photo, but if you make minor
changes to the photos, the human cannot distinguish between
the difference before and after the two photos. However, the
image recognition program may identify the modified image
as other objects, such as cars, just because of multiple subtle
superimposed changes on several certain pixels. To certificates,
we think that the certificate also has such nature that the
programs is very sensitive to content changes in certificates
even the change is very small. It is unlikely that a one-time
modification makes a certificate get a different verify result, so
the combination of multiple modifications is a better choice.
Therefore, we chose deep reinforcement learning, as it can
help us choose the best next action according to the result of
a previous modification.
Based on the practical testing and our empirical knowledge,
we deployed a three-layer neural network for DRLgencert. The
concrete configuration parameters are listed in Table III.
According to the classic definition of Mnih et al. [24],
the loss function in DRLgencert is defined as Equation 1, in
which:
• reward: After cert being changed to cert′, reward is
gotten from differential testing.
• max(network(cert)): Using a cert as input, it is the max
value in output.
• max(network(cert′)): Using cert′ as input, it is the max
value in output.
• γ : It is a constant, between 0 and 1. We set it to 0.9 in
our experiment.
As shown in Figure 3, the neural network uses the certificate
feature as input, and the output represents the modification
actions. The reward (from the differential testing result) deter-
mines whether further actions are required. In the following
sub-sections, we will discuss the designs of feature, modifica-
tion action, and reward respectively.
TABLE II
VERIFICATION RESULTS CLASSIFICATION
Verification Result Error Code GnuTLS MatrixSSL MbedTLS NSS OpenSSL wolfSSL
Valid 1
√ √ √ √ √ √
Unknown issuer -1
√ √∗ √ √
Validity period error -2
√∗ √ √ √∗ √ √
Parsing error -3
√∗ √ √∗ √
Version error -4
√∗ √ √
Algorithm error -5
√∗
Signature error -6
√∗ √ √ √
Subject/Issuer error -7
√∗ √
Key usage error -8
√∗ √ √
Casic constraints error -9
√
Unknown critical extension -10
√ √ √
Chain error -11
√ √
Self sign -12
√
Connection error -13
√∗
Other extension error -14
√∗
Other error -15
√
indicates that the verification result has been triggered by the program.
∗ indicates that multiple different verification results are grouped into the category.
TABLE III
NETWORK CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
Layer Input Dimension Output Dimension Activation Function
Layer 0: fully connected layer 101 100 ReLU
Layer 1: fully connected layer 100 100 ReLU
Layer 2: fully connected layer 100 86 /
loss(cert) =
{
reward−max(network(cert)) modifications are finished
reward+ γ ∗ (max(network(cert′)))−max(network(cert)) modifications are unfinished (1)
A. Feature Extraction
Before making a certificate change, we need to characterize
the certificate entity and use a vector to represent the content
of the certificate. We refer to the feature extraction scheme of
Dong et al. [16] and design a more accurate feature extraction
scheme.
The certificate consists of a number of different content
components. The value type of some parts is the number,
others are string or bool. In the DRLgencert framework, we
extract the relevant features from the version, issuer, subject,
notafter, notbefore, public key length, signature algorithm, and
extensions of the certificate. A total of 101 numbers are used
as the feature of a certificate, as the following example.
[2, 0, 1, 2, 1, -1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0,
3, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2]
Version. The version of the current mainstream certificate
is 3. Version 1 and version 2 are also possible, but we can
not limit version to [1, 2, 3] as we are not sure whether other
versions of certificates exist and someone may deliberately
make other versions of certificates. Therefore, DRLgencert
directly uses the certificate version value as a feature.
Issuer and subject. In the certificate verification process,
generally, only the issuer of the certificate and the subject
of the superior certificate are checked to judge whether they
are the same, without regard for the meaning indicated by
the values of subject and issuer. However, it does not exclude
that some processes of certificates verification codes are rather
special, so we extract the value of the country of subject and
issuer as certificate features, with number label to represent.
Notafter and notbefore. The validity period of certificate is
compared with the current time, so we use the comparison
result of the validity period and the current time as a feature.
-1 means notbefore or notafter is before the current time. 0
means equal and 1 means they are after the current time.
Public key length. Public key length extraction scheme is
similar to the processing of version. Its value is a numeric
type, and cannot be guaranteed to ensure the value of public
key length is in a certain range, so public key length uses its
value as a feature.
Signature algorithm. Collect signature algorithm types that
appear in the certificate set. Different numbers are used to
label different signature algorithms.
Extensions. Extensions are optional content for certificates.
The existence and type of extensions in a certificate are
not fixed, and users can customize the types of their own
extensions. Each extension must contain three contents: oid,
iscritical, value. In DRLgencert system, we use three ways
to extract extension features. According to the number of
different types of extensions in collected certificate set and the
difficulty of getting the content feature of a certain extension
type, we choose different extraction methods for different
kinds of extensions.
1) Get feature according to the extension’s iscritical and
value.
2) Get feature according to the extension’s iscritical and
isexist.
3) Ignore the extension.
Finally, in DRLgencert, we use an array of length 93 to
represent extensions.
B. Certificate Modification Action
In our settings, if a certificate cannot trigger a discrepancy in
the differential testing, namely, there is no difference between
verification results of tested programs, we think the certificate
and its validation results have no value for further analysis
for validation codes. Then we will modify the content of the
certificate, expecting the modified certificate will have the
value we want. In DRLgencert, we designed a total of 86
modification actions, such as changing ’Version’, changing
’Not before’, deleting a certain extension. Each action modifies
a part of the certificate and does not destroy its semantic
constraints. At the same time, the modification operation will
try to change the feature value of the certificate. In brief, in
order to change content and feature value of a certificate, we
designed these modification operations. We set a maximum of
nine times of changes per certificate.
C. Reward
In the reinforcement learning, after an agent takes action to
change its state, the environment will feedback a correspond-
ing reward to show the pros and cons of the result generated
by the action. In DRLgencert, the reward is obtained from
the discrepancy’s encoding. As described in Section IV, we
reclassify the verification results of each validation program
and encode them with new error codes, so we use a sequence
of error codes to represent a discrepancy as its encoding.
In the preliminary experiment, we defined the reward as:
assume that before the modification, the number of categories
of cert1’s verification results in 6 tested programs is c1.
After the modification, cert1 becomes cert2. The number of
categories of cert2 verification results is c2. Then we define
reward as (c2-c1).
If the reward is greater than 0, or c2 is equal to 6 (the number
of verification programs), DRLgencert stops the process of
modification and starts to select another certificate from the
certificate data set. Because that if the reward is greater than
0, it means there are more types of verification results we
achieve. The nature of discrepancy is clarified. DRLgencert
helps to generate a discrepancy or make the discrepancy more
distinctive. If reward = 6, then there is no need to make more
changes. It has reached the maximum value.
However, when analyzing the generated discrepancies, we
found that because of the limited manual efforts, this design is
not suitable as it generates too many low-value discrepancies.
Therefore, we redefined the reward. The new definition is: if
acceptance and rejection both exist in the validation result, that
is, there are 1 and non-1 in the validation result encoding, the
reward is defined as 100. Otherwise, the reward is -1. During
the training process, the neural network will be trained to get
reward as large as possible. Therefore, essentially, we only
need to ensure that the reward value used to mark discrepancy
is bigger than that used to mark non-discrepancy. In order
to make neural network distinguish between discrepancy and
non-discrepancy more distinctly, we expanded the gap between
their rewards, empirically set to 100 and -1. When the reward
is equal to 100, the certificate’s modification process is over,
as shown in Figure 3.
Comparing the effects of the two reward definitions, al-
though the first strategy eventually obtains more discrepancies
as defined in previous work, not every discrepancy has high
analytical value as many discrepancies are encoded with differ-
ent rejection reports. The program that accepts a certificate is
highly likely to have flaws when all the other programs reject
the same certificate. Therefore, from the perspective of dif-
ferential testing, the discrepancies containing both acceptance
and rejection have more value for analysis than those only
containing different rejection reports. The second definition
helps us filter out these low-value discrepancies.
Since we used manual methods to analyze code based on
discrepancies statically, the workload of code analysis is a
key factor to consider in system design. If there are enough
manual efforts, the first reward definition will be better for
finding more flaws as the discrepancies consisting of different
rejection reports may also contain hidden flaws. In our case,
DRLgencert adopts the second reward definition, spending less
time on more valuable discrepancies.
VI. RESULTS
We implemented DRLgencert and carried out a series of
experiments to demonstrate its effectiveness.
A. Certificate Collection
In our experiment, we used ZMap [17] and OpenSSL [6] to
collect certificates as seeds. With ZMap, we obtained 300,000
IP addresses that open the 443 port. Then, using OpenSSL
s client to connect to these IPs, we collected 181,900 certifi-
cate samples. One of the failure reasons for getting a certificate
is that some IPs opened the 443 port but did not provide their
certificates.
B. Certificate Generation
Table IV shows the types of discrepancies generated by
DRLgencert in the experiment. Discrepancies are encoded in
the format shown in Figure 4, and each type of discrepancy
contains both acceptance and rejection (negative code are all
considered as rejection).
Table V shows the discrepancy amount obtained by DRL-
gencert, and we could find the performance is quite efficient.
Compared with Frankencert [9], DRLgencert could get more
discrepancy-triggering certificates. Using the 181,900 certifi-
cates as the training set, DRLgencert got 84,661 discrepancy-
triggering certificates (46.5% effectiveness) in first train-
ing episode of DRL network. Based on the same 181,900
certificates, Frankencert1 only achieved 54,791 discrepancy-
triggering certificates (30.1% effectiveness) in a total of
181,900 outputted certificates.
C. Flaws in Certificate Verification Code
Based on the generated discrepancies, we found 23 flaws in
these tested SSL/TLS implementations, as listed in Table VI.
Among them, there are 14 flaws not discussed before. These
flaws may lead to severe security threats, such as man-in-
the-middle attacks. We have reported all of them to the
corresponding vendors, and the assessments are in process.
Here we analyze some typical flaws as showcases.
1) Incorrect checking of time: The content of the certificate
contains two timestamps: notbefore and notafter. When the
certificate is validated, the current time must be after notbe-
fore, before notafter. Otherwise, the certificate is invalid. The
current time must be GMT2. After analysis, we found that in
these 6 SSL/TLS implementations, MatrixSSL and mbedTLS
both use local system time instead of GMT.
Another finding is: according to RFC5280 [12, 4.1.2.5], the
time checking should check whether notbefore is earlier than
the current time and whether notafter is later than the current
time. However, MatrixSSL is not this case. The relevant code
of time checking in MatrixSSL is as follows (Listing 1):
1 if (psBrokenDownTimeCmp(&beforeTime, &
timeNowLinger) > 0)
2 {
3 /* beforeTime is in future. */
4 cert->authFailFlags |=
PS_CERT_AUTH_FAIL_DATE_FLAG;
5 }
6 else if (psBrokenDownTimeCmp(&timeNow, &
afterTimeLinger) > 0)
7 {
8 /* afterTime is in past. */
9 cert->authFailFlags |=
PS_CERT_AUTH_FAIL_DATE_FLAG;
10 }
Listing 1: Time checking code in MatrixSSL (part 1)
1We also tried to deploy Mucert [10] and compared the results. However,
Mucert was not maintained anymore, and the deployment procedure is not
very friendly, which requires the customized execution environment and
program instrumentation. After multiple attempts, we still did not run Mucert
successfully.
2Greenwich Mean Time, the mean solar time at the Royal Observatory in
Greenwich, London.
In Listing 1, the “timeNowLinger” and “afterTimeLinger”
variables are one day later than “timeNow” and “afterTime”.
The relevant code is shown in Listing 2.
1 /* The default value of allowed mismatch in times
in X.509 messages and the local clock. The
default value of 24 hours is mostly
equivalent to old MatrixSSL behavior of
ignoring hours, minutes and seconds in X.509
date comparison. Note: There is different
value for CRL (PS_CRL_TIME_LINGER) and OCSP (
PS_OCSP_TIME_LINGER). */
2 # define PS_X509_TIME_LINGER (24 * 60 * 60)
3 ...
4 memcpy(&timeNowLinger, &timeNow, sizeof
timeNowLinger);
5 err = psBrokenDownTimeAdd(&timeNowLinger,
PS_X509_TIME_LINGER);
Listing 2: Time checking code in MatrixSSL (part 2)
As we can see from the above code, in MatrixSSL, the time
check is unique. It compares notbefore with (current time + 1
day) and compares (notafter + 1 day) with the current time. So,
if MatrixSSL is used to validate the certificate, the certificate
will take effect one day in advance and postpone one day
expired. In some scenarios, the lifetime of a certificate may
be very short. For example, in Google’s ALTS protocol [2], a
handshake certificate usually is valid for 20 hours only. The
error of extra one day before or after is undoubtedly a serious
problem.
2) Incorrect checking of v1/v2 with X.509 v3 extension:
According to discrepancy analysis, it is found that NSS,
OpenSSL, and GnuTLS accept version 1 certificates with v3
extensions, wolfSSL rejects them. For version 2 certificates
with v3 extensions, NSS, OpenSSL, GnuTLS, MatrixSSL
accept them, and wolfSSL rejects them. According to the RFC
documentation, this field (v3 extensions) MUST only appear
if the version is 3 [12, 4.1.2.9]. So, every v1 or v2 certificate
with v3 extensions is unqualified and should not be trusted.
Our analysis found that one of the main reasons for this is that
in the program code, version testing and extension testing are
two independent content. The program does not judge whether
the extension can exist based on the version.
3) Incorrect checking of v1/v2 intermediate certificate:
Applications may locally trust a v1 root CA. So, v1 root
certificate can be trusted. However, all version 1 and version
2 intermediate certificates must be rejected unless they can be
verified to be a CA certificate through out-of-band.
If there is a trusted version 1 or version 2 intermediate
certificate, since there is no v3 extension to limit its scope,
they can act as a rough CA. They can sign any domain
name, any number of next level certificates. These subordinate
certificates can be used for man-in-the-middle attacks and
other bad intentions. The related statements exist in the official
RFC documentation: If certificate i is a version 1 or version
2 certificate, then the application MUST either verify that
certificate i is a CA certificate through out-of-band means
or reject the certificate. Conforming implementations may
choose to reject all version 1 and version 2 intermediate
certificates [12, 6.1.4(k)].
TABLE IV
DISCREPANCIES GENERATED IN THE FIRST TRAINING EPISODE: TYPE
Sequence number GnuTLS MatrixSSL MbedTLS NSS OpenSSL wolfSSL Sequence number GnuTLS MatrixSSL MbedTLS NSS OpenSSL wolfSSL
1 1 -14 -6 1 1 1 32 -3 -14 -6 -1 -1 1
2 -1 -14 -6 -4 -1 1 32 -3 -14 -6 -1 -1 1
3 1 -15 -6 1 1 1 34 1 -15 -3 -4 1 -4
4 -1 -15 -3 1 -1 -4 35 1 -10 -3 -4 -10 -13
5 -3 -15 -3 1 1 -4 36 1 -14 -3 1 -1 -4
6 -3 -15 -3 -4 1 -4 37 1 -15 -3 1 -10 1
7 -1 -15 -3 -10 -1 1 38 1 -14 -3 1 1 -13
8 -3 -14 -3 -4 -1 1 39 -3 -15 -6 -4 -1 1
9 -3 -15 -3 -4 -1 1 40 -3 -14 -6 1 1 -13
10 1 -14 -6 -4 -1 1 41 1 -15 -6 -8 1 -13
11 -14 -14 -6 -1 -1 1 42 1 -8 -3 -4 -1 -4
12 1 -15 -3 -8 1 -4 43 -3 -15 -6 1 1 -13
13 -3 -14 -6 1 1 1 44 1 -14 -3 -4 -1 -4
14 -3 -15 -3 -1 -1 1 45 -1 -15 -6 -1 -1 1
15 -1 -8 -6 -4 -1 1 46 1 -15 -3 -8 -10 -13
16 -1 -15 -3 1 -1 -13 47 1 -15 -6 -4 1 1
17 -1 -15 -3 -1 -1 1 48 1 -10 -6 1 1 -13
18 1 -14 -3 1 1 -4 49 1 -10 -3 -10 -10 -13
19 1 -15 -6 -4 1 -13 50 1 -15 -3 -4 -10 -13
20 1 -14 -6 1 -1 1 51 1 -15 -3 1 1 -13
21 -3 -15 -6 -4 1 1 52 1 -15 -3 -10 -10 1
22 1 -14 -3 -4 1 -4 53 1 -10 -3 1 -10 -13
23 -3 -15 -6 -1 -1 1 54 -1 -15 -3 -4 -1 1
24 -3 -15 -6 1 1 1 55 1 -14 -6 1 1 -13
25 1 -15 -3 1 1 -4 56 -1 -8 -6 -1 -1 1
26 1 -14 -3 1 1 1 57 -14 -15 -3 1 1 -4
27 1 -15 -3 -4 1 -13 58 1 -15 -6 1 -1 1
28 -1 -15 -6 -4 -1 1 59 -3 -15 -3 -4 -10 1
29 1 -10 -6 -4 1 -13 60 1 -15 -3 -8 1 -13
30 1 -15 -6 1 1 -13 61 -1 -14 -6 -1 -1 1
31 -1 -14 -3 -4 -1 1
The numbers represent different verification results as shown in Table II.
TABLE V
DISCREPANCIES GENERATED IN FIRST TRAINING EPISODE: AMOUNT
Certificate Size Discrepancy Amount
Proportion
(discrepancy/cert library)
6057 3605 59.5%
15179 9404 61.9%
84063 49881 59.3%
148939 78006 52.3%
181900 84661 46.5%
In our test, we found that: NSS, OpenSSL, GnuTLS, Ma-
trixSSL all accept v1/v2 intermediate certificates and consider
these certificates valid. Only wolfSSL rejected it. MbedTLS
rejected these because of other unrelated reasons, mainly
failing to load the certificate.
4) Incorrect checking of version: V3 certificates are now
widely used and accepted, and in some cases, v1 and v2
certificates are considered valid. Certificates of any other
versions are all invalid. However, the test found GnuTLS, NSS,
OpenSSL, wolfSSL will accept v4 certificates, although v3 is
the latest version of the X.509 certificate.
5) Incorrect checking of serial number: One of the require-
ments for the serial number in the RFC documentation is:
the serial number MUST be a positive integer assigned by
the CA to each certificate [12, 4.1.2.2]. However, multiple
certificates with negative sequence numbers were found in
the generated discrepancy-triggering certificates, and they are
trusted by GnuTLS, NSS, and OpenSSL.
Another requirement for serial numbers is: Conforming
CAs MUST NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20
octets [12, 4.1.2.2]. This statement is somewhat ambiguous.
The first meaning is: CA certificate must not contain serial-
Number values longer than 20 octets. The second meaning is:
CAs must not assign serialNumber values longer than 20 octets
to next level certificate. In discrepancy-triggering certificates,
there are certificates containing a serial number with a length
of 37 octets, and GnuTLS, NSS, and OpenSSL accepted the
certificate. If the RFC documentation requirements refer to
the second meaning or both, GnuTLS, NSS, and OpenSSL
obviously violate the RFC documentation requirements.
6) Inappropriate error report: In some cases, the same
certificate may contain several different types of insecure
contents that can result in varying degrees of security threats.
The test found that in six programs, only mbedTLS gave mul-
tiple security warnings at the same time, and other programs
reported only one security warning. The reason is that in the
verification code of these programs when the first security
threat is found, the verification code will directly return. This
will introduce a security risk. If a certificate has many different
security threats at the same time, for example, expiration for
one week and self-signed, users will probably only receive
a warning that the certificate expires one week. The bigger
security threat self-signed is obscured. Some careless users,
TABLE VI
DISCOVERED FLAWS
Flaw Type GnuTLS MatrixSSL MbedTLS NSS OpenSSL wolfSSL
Incorrect checking of time 2 1
Incorrect checking of v1/v2 with X.509 v3 extension 1 1 1 1
Incorrect checking of v1/v2 intermediate certificate 1 1 1 1
Incorrect checking of version 1 1 1 1
Incorrect checking of serial number 1 1 1
Inappropriate error report 1 1 1 1 1
Total 5 5 1 5 5 2
aware of the certificate expires only one week, likely choose
to manually trust the certificate since it was just invalid, and
this may result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
Inspired by this, we made a certificate, containing self-
signed, expired, unstructured subject name. The unstructured
subject name means the name of the subject in the certificate
does not fit the document format, but this does not introduce
a security problem. When verifying the certificate, we found
that mbedTLS reported both self-signed and expired security
warnings. OpenSSL and wolfSSL showed a self-signing warn-
ing. GnuTLS and MatrixSSL showed parsing errors (for the
unstructured subject name), and we think this description is
reasonable and sufficient since this implies the certificate has
not been validated. However, NSS only displayed expiration
warning. So from this perspective, the programs using NSS’s
service may suffer from the danger we previously assumed.
VII. RELATED WORK
There are already efforts of detecting vulnerabilities in
SSL/TLS implementations. In this section, we will review
some typical works. Also, some application cases of deep
learning in security areas will be retrospected.
A. Security of SSL/TLS Implementations
The SSL and TLS protocols are the foundation of modern
network security. Whether SSL/TLS tools and libraries are
correctly implemented are vital, and several previous works
focused on validating their implementations.
Stone et al. [30] focused on the certificate hostname verifi-
cation in TLS implementations. They showed that in security-
sensitive applications, if the certificate pinning is used, it can
hide the lack of proper hostname verification, enabling MITM
attacks. They also presented a tool to detect such kind of
vulnerability.
Sivakorn et al. [29] directly tested the hostname verification
in TLS implementations. They presented HVLearn, a novel
black-box testing framework for analysis, which is based on
automata learning algorithms. Moreover, this framework helps
to find several unique violations of the RFC specifications in
hostname verification implementations.
Acer et al. [8] investigated the root causes of Chrome
HTTPS certificate errors. Since hundreds of millions of spuri-
ous browser warnings are triggered per month, they frustrated
users and undermined the trust in browser warnings, which
may cause users to ignore the real warning. This finding
shows that client-side or network issues caused more than
half of errors. Based on this finding, Acer et al. redesigned
the warnings of the browser. In our paper, we have a similar
discovery, also about the wrong warning. We conducted a
differential testing on multiple SSL certificate validation codes
and found a phenomenon that multiple verification codes gave
different error warnings for the same certificate, and each
verification code gave only one error warning. So we refer that
if there are a slight error and a serious error in a certificate,
there may be a validation code that shows only minor error
warning to users and masks serious error.
Hawanna et al. [22] proposed a framework which assesses
the risk associated with X.509 certificates. By using the
random forest machine learning algorithm, this framework
provides users with three risk levels – high risk, medium
risk, and low risk, and mentions due to which parameter
it bears the risk. Another example of applying machine
learning methods to HTTPS security is the work of Dong
et al. [16]. Unlike the above work, they did not focus on
the flaws in TLS implementations. They aimed to design a
method for distinguishing rogue certificates which are valid
certificates issued by a legitimate certificate authority (CA) but
untrustworthy. In order to implement this method, they built
machine-learning models with Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
to automate classification. Similar to their idea, encouraged
by the powerful performance of machine learning, we also
apply machine learning to test SSL/TLS implementations.
The difference is that we focus on the implementation errors
and logic errors in the certificate validation phase. Also, we
combine differential testing and deep reinforcement learning,
which is different from the models used in the work of
Hawanna et al. and Dong et al. and do not need to set the
label for the data set.
The most closely work to ours is Frankencert [9] and
Mucert [10]. We use the same test method – differential testing
to test the SSL/TLS implementations. However, since both
Frankencert and Mucert generate new certificates by random
combinations of parts of certificates, introducing too much
randomness. As a result, most of the generated certificates
are invalid or valueless for differential testing. In contrast, we
are using new ways to get a large number of certificates with
the information learned in a neural network. The experimental
results confirmed that we can get more valuable certificates.
B. Applications of Deep Learning in Security
There are many applications of deep learning in security.
One of the primary applications is to develop classifiers for
security tasks. Prade et al. [25] presented a general framework,
called DeepBugs which extracts positive training examples
from a code corpus, leverages simple program transformations
to create negative training examples, and trains a model to
distinguish these two. Tsai et al. [31] reviewed 55 related
studies focusing on developing single, hybrid, and ensemble
classifiers. The work of Dong et al. mentioned above is also
a specific example of such kind of applications.
Godefroid et al. [19] demonstrated using sample inputs and
neural-network-based statistical machine-learning to automate
the generation of an input grammar suitable for input fuzzing.
The Portable Document Format (PDF) was used as the com-
plex input format in a case study, and they used recurrent
neural network (RNN) [21] to capture the structure of PDF
and then generate new PDF files to fuzz PDF parser.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new idea of applying deep
learning to differential testing of certificate validation. We
introduce DRLgencert, a framework using deep reinforce-
ment learning to generate discrepancy-triggering test cases
for testing SSL/TLS implementations. The results show that
DRLgencert is a valid and promising automatic system for
generating test cases. After the first round of training, statistics
show that it can modify certificates to discrepancy-triggering
cases with a probability of more than 46%. By conducting
experiments in the real environment, DRLgencert successfully
identified 23 certificate verification flaws on six popular SS-
L/TLS implementations.
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